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Abstract
The quality of education appears to be negatively correlated with both the overeducation of
workers at the tasks they perform and the unemployment rate across EU-15 countries, and
positively correlated with the wage premium associated to tertiary education. We develop a
model of the labor market with frictions to quantitatively investigate the impact of the education
outcomes on the labor market. We show that both the ability of educated and non educated
workers have sizable effects on the incentives of firms regarding the type of vacancies they open
and also regarding the incentives of educated workers as of where to search for a job. Therefore
education outcomes are relevant to understand the overeducation phenomena observed in the
labor market. According to our quantitative analysis had the quality of education observed in
Spain been similar to the European average then the overeducation rate would have been between
5 and 10 percentage points lower and the unemployment rate of the two types of workers would
be reduced by 40%, but the tertiary education wage premium would be slightly smaller than in
the benchmark economy.
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1 Introduction
Across the EU-15 countries there is substantial variation in the skills of the adult population
as measured by the average math score in the Programme for the International Assessment of
Adult Competencies (PIAAC, 2013). As reported in the third column of Table 1 this figure
ranges from 245 in Spain to 282 in Sweden and sizable differences remain even if only tertiary
educated workers are considered (forth column). Interestingly, the average math score in the
PIAAC is strongly and negatively correlated with two important labor market outcomes: the
fraction of mismatched workers1 (fifth column) and the unemployment rate of both tertiary
educated and non educated workers (columns sixth and seventh). This negative correlation is
also found if we restrict to the sub-sample of countries which share a similar fraction of tertiary
educated workers. In particular, excluding Italy and Portugal, which report a fraction of tertiary
educated workers clearly below the average of the EU-15, and Belgium and the UK, for which the
different statistics are not measured with a comparable sample, the correlation of math scores
with the fraction of overeducated workers is -0.84 and its correlation with the unemployment rate
of both educated and non-educated workers is about -0.77. Furthermore, there is a strong and
positive correlation of 0.7 between math scores and the wage premium to tertiary education.2,3
Finally, there is empirical evidence supporting the importance of abilities as measured by the
PIAAC to account for difference in income across countries, both at the aggregate level and at
the individual level.4
The previous observations suggest that there may be a close connection between the outcomes
of the education system, in terms of the quality of labor, and the degree of mismatch, the unem-
ployment rate and the education wage premium. The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively
investigate this connection by means of an equilibrium model. The literature based on equilib-
rium search to assess the effects of education policies on labor market outcomes is scarce. An
important exception is Albrecht et al. (2009) which forecasts the long-run effects of a Swedish
adult education program known as the Knowledge Lift implemented at the end of the nineties.
This is an adult education program aimed at improving the skills of low-skilled workers towards
the medium level. According to their analysis, as a result of the policy the fraction of vacancies
tailored towards the medium-skill workers increases substantially. For each outcome measure,
the treated gain most from the program. Those who have always been medium skilled also
benefit, whereas those who remain low skilled suffer. We contribute to this literature and pose a
search and matching model of the labor market à la Mortensen and Pissarides in which workers
are heterogeneous in terms of their innate ability and in terms of their education. Our model,
1The notion of mismatch we adopt here is the definition of vertical mismatch proposed by Eurostat: individuals
with at least tertiary education working in occupations for which the education requirement is lower. See the
Appendix A for further details. In the literature this notion of mismatch is sometimes called overeducation or
over-qualification (hence we will use it interchangeably) and there are several alternatives to measure it (see for
instance Leuven and Oosterbeeck 2011 and the many references therein).
2In this calculation we exclude Denmark and Sweden because the labor markets in these countries are dra-
matically different to the markets in other European countries in relevant dimensions such as a large centralized
bargaining, high female participation and social protection, amongst others.
3All the statistics provided in Table 1 are for 2007 in order to avoid the effect of the Great Recession after
2009 on labour market variables.
4Hidalgo-Cabrillana et al. (2017) find that differences in physical capital together with a broad measure of
human capital that includes PIAAC ability account for 42% of the variance in output per worker, compared to
only 27% when proxying human capital by average years of schooling only. At the individual level Hanushek et
al. (2015) find that one-standard-deviation increase in numeracy skills as measured by the PIAAC is associated
with a 18% percent wage increase among prime-age workers.
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Fraction Tertiary PIAAC Tert. PIAAC Mismatch Unemp. Unemp.
Tert. Wage Prem. Scor. Scor. Below Tert. Tert.
Belgiuma 31 1.43 276 310 20 0.07 0.03
Denmark 30 1.41 278 302 17 0.02 0.02
Germany 29 1.64 268 301 23 0.09 0,03
Ireland 31 1.60 254 285 30 0.07 0.03
Spain 29 1.51 245 278 34 0.10 0.05
France 26 1.66 254 295 18 0.06 0.04
Greece 24 - - - - 0.04 0.04
Italy 12 2.09 249 280 13 0.05 0.03
Luxembourg 30 1.73 - - - 0.05 0.02
Netherlands 35 1.59 284 308 11 0.02 0.02
Austria 21 1.66 280 306 25 0.03 0.02
Portugal 11 2.55 - - - 0.06 0.04
Finland 31 1.66 280 305 13 0.06 0.03
Sweden 28 1.40 282 307 14 0.04 0.03
U.K.b 31 1.54 260 269 20 0.04 0.02
EU-15 27 1.68 268 295 19 0.05 0.03
Faction Tert.: fraction of tertiary educated workers from Education at a Glance OECD 2010, Table A1.1b.
Tertiary Wage Prem: calculated from earnings as reported in Education at a Glance OECD 2010, Table A7.1
(page 127). PIAAC Scor.: PIAAC National Report. Chapter 3. Volume 1. Table 3.16 L y M. Mismatch: Eurostat
Overeducation 2009. Table 8. Unemployment: Education at a Glance OECD 2010. Table A6.2b (male individuals
aged 25 to 65).
Notes: (a) PIAAC data is for the Flemish Region only, (b) PIAAC is for England and North Ireland only.
Table 1: Several Statistics, EU-15
therefore, will be able to shed light on the relationship between the equilibrium allocation of
ability and unemployment. The level of education of each worker is determined by an education
rule which plays a twofold role: selection, it selects the abilities (i.e., workers) that receive higher
education, and quality, it increases the effective ability of educated workers. The education rule
is a shortcut to obtain an education outcome without the need to fully specify an education
policy along the lines of those in place in actual economies. With this approach we focus our
analysis on the impact of education outcomes in the labor market.
In the quantitative analysis we take as a benchmark the case of Spain. This choice is motivated
by the fact that in Spain the average math score according to PIAAC is among the lowest in
EU-15,5 whereas the fraction of overeducated workers and the unemployment rate is among
the highest in the EU-15. In addition, in Spain the wage premium to tertiary education is
substantially smaller than in most of the EU-15 countries. We calibrate the model to mimic key
observations of the Spanish economy in the mid 2000’s and we conduct several counterfactual
experiments to evaluate the effects of alternative education outcomes. For completeness we also
5According to Robles-Zurita (2017) the LOGSE (Spanish acronym for General Law of the Education System)
reform passed in 1990 did not help to increase cognitive skills of the population, as measured by the PIAAC, despite
an extension of compulsory years of education and postponement of the age of initial tracking into vocational and
academic studies. In the Appendix A we provide a more detailed comparison of the education system and of the
mismatch phenomena in Spain and in the EU-15 countries.
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explore other possibilities related to differences in the sectors’ productivity across countries.
Our findings support the view that enhancing the productivity of tertiary educated workers and
implementing a more stringent selection of abilities into education would substantially reduce the
fraction of overeducated workers. The intuition for this result comes from the basic mechanism
at work in the AV family of models: an increase in the quality of educated workers produces
an increase in its demand (and a reduction in the demand of the non educated). Thus it is
worth to emphasize that the decrease in overeducation comes at the cost of an increase of the
unemployment rate of non-educated workers. This result follows because the new education
outcome mainly improves the productivity of educated agents relative to non educated workers.
Once we target an education outcome such that the effective ability of both educated and non-
educated workers is in line with what is observed in the average of EU-15, then we obtain
a smaller, but still substantial reduction in overeducation, but a more notorious reduction in
the unemployment rate of non-educated workers and a large increase in the Gross Domestic
Product. The size of the reduction in overeducation depends however on the means by which
the effective ability of educated workers is improved (selection vs quality). This result highlights
the relevance of the distribution of abilities among the pool of workers searching for a job in a
particular market to understand employment overeducation in equilibrium. We therefore view
our results as suggesting that education outcomes have sizable effects on the labor market. We
also explore the implications of a reduction (increase) in the productivity of the l-tech sector (h-
sector) designed to meet the fraction of overeducated workers observed in the EU-15 countries.
We find that such changes in productivity have a negative effect on the unemployment rate of
ne-workers and a very modest effect on the wage premium to education. Thus the gap in terms
of average skills for all workers between Spain and the EU-15 countries remains unexplained in
this case.
A distinctive feature of our model is that there is a continuum of abilities. Both the distribution
of abilities and the quality of labor are key variables that determine the profitability of vacancies
posted by firms, which we assume that can be opened in a high and in a low-tech sector. Likewise,
the education outcome of the rule determines the degree of competition among workers looking
for jobs in each sector, which is relevant for them to choose where they would like to find a job.
Thus with these assumptions the model is able to capture overeducation as educated workers
accepting jobs in the low-tech sector. Since ability is continuously distributed, overeducation
can happen to various degrees in an endogenous way. This is an important difference with
respect to previous papers such us Albrecht and Vroman (2002) [AV] and Cuadras-Morató and
Mateos-Planas (2013) [CMMP] in which mismatch is a binary event. Therefore our approach
allows a more flexible mix of abilities and education than in previous papers which is convenient
to undertake a meaningful quantitative analysis.6
In our model we abstract from job-to-job transitions and thus we focus on the persistent nature
of overeducation. This is an important difference with respect to other papers in the literature in
6In this line of research see Blazquez and Jansen (2008) whom study the efficiency properties of equilibrium
allocations in the AV model. More recently, CMMP introduce two education levels in the AV model and quantita-
tively study the effects of skill bias technological change (SBTC) in the US with respect to overeducation. See also
Krusell et al. (2000) for an earlier application to the U.S. economy. The literature on the SBTC tries to account
for mismatch and the skill premium by changes in the relative demand of educated workers. Our approach here
is to asses the ability of changes in the relative supply and quality of skilled labor. Regarding education choices,
Charlot and Decreuse (2010) study the efficiency in a similar model and show that overeducation (in the sense
of too many individuals choosing to acquire education) arises since workers do not internalize the impact of their
decision on the wage and employment perspectives of others.
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which overeducation is a way for workers to find their best match in the labor market and thus
it is a transitory phenomena.7 Our choice is motivated by the empirical evidence reported in
Hidalgo-Pérez et al. (2015) suggesting that in Spain the fraction of mismatched college workers
decreases very moderately with age (from 60% in the age group 30 to 34 to 50% in the age group
50 to 54).8 This persistence of over-qualification is also consistent with the findings in Montalvo
(2013) and Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2017), hence overeducation in Spain does not appear to be
a transitory phenomena affecting just a reduced age-specific group of workers.9 Our approach,
therefore, can be seen as complementing previous work exploring the implications for transitory
over-qualification phenomena when job-to-job transitions are allowed. In particular, Dolado et
al. (2009) extend the model in AV and, among other things, they show that transitory skill
mismatch by over-qualified workers is more harmful to the prospects of less-educated workers
than permanent mismatch and that on-the-job search widens the wage differences among the
highly educated workers. However, the quantitative work in Dolado et al. (2009) focuses on the
U.S. and on a European average for which the possibility of transitory mismatch may be a more
appropriate assumption compared to the Spanish case. Finally, the nature of mismatch at the
center of our investigation is also different from the one stressed in other papers investigating
mismatch as a result of frictions preventing sectoral and geographical adjustment of employment
and its dynamics over the business cycle.10
Our work is also related to Dolado et al. (2000) exploring the importance of labor market
institutions (job separation rate and the replacement rate) to understand the crowding-out of
lower educated workers from their traditional entry jobs by higher educated workers. As em-
phasized above, our focus is instead on the importance of education outcomes to understand
the aforementioned facts. An alternative explanation for the mismatch phenomena is provided
by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) who show that the more generous unemployment benefits in
Continental Western Europe relative to the U.S. are able to explain the higher unemployment
rates, the better quality of the matches between workers and jobs (i.e., the smaller occupation
mismatch), and lower wage inequality observed in Europe than in the U.S. However, unemploy-
ment benefits in Spain are comparable to the ones in other European countries, and thus the
argument runs counter to the higher overeducation observed in Spain.11 Finally, our approach
can also be seen as an alternative to the view that there are demand factors that may be able
7To obtain this sort of experimentation as an equilibrium outcome it is necessary to consider a model including
heterogeneity -as we do- and asymmetric or incomplete information, a feature that our model abstracts from.
Prominent examples in this line of research include Jovanovic (1979), Miller (1984) and more recently Papageorgiou
(2014).
8These authors use a sample of the Social Security Records of the Spanish population (Muestra Continua de
Vidas Laborales, MCVL) to explore the puzzling fall in the wage skill premium in Spain over the last decades.
They also study the evolution of occupational mismatch among college graduated workers.
9Montalvo (2013) uses the Spanish School to Work Transition database to study these questions and finds
that over-qualification is a very absorbing state since transition matrices show that the probability to continue
overqualified after moving to a new job is 76%. Meroni and Vera-Toscano (2017) find evidence of a systematic
trap into overeducation in Southern Europe using REFLEX survey.
10This notion of mismatch could be due for instance to workers looking for jobs in occupations that do not
correspond to the field of education they have attended, known as horizontal mismatch in the statistics produced
by Eurostat. Examples in this line of research include Sahin et al. (2014), Dvorkin (2013) and Guvenen et al.
(2015).
11Unemployment benefits are multidimensional and thus it is not straightforward to choose the relevant dimen-
sions of comparison. Stovicek and Turrini (2012) report evidence suggesting that Finland, the Netherlands and
Spain are particularly generous in terms of replacement rates and duration of benefits in comparison with other
European countries. For additional details on other OECD countries see also http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-
and-wages-statistics.htm.
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to explain the relatively high unemployment and overeducation and the low wage premium to
education observed in Spain. In fact, Dı́az and Franjo (2016) use a version of the Neoclassical
model of growth to report an inefficiently high investment rate in residential investment but
too low in Investment Specific Technical Change. These authors conduct a growth accounting
exercise and use a representative agent model in a frictionless economy which prevents them
from addressing the main issues in our investigation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop the model economy that we use as
framework for our analysis. In section 3 we discuss the calibration of the model to match relevant
statistics of the labor market and education outcomes in Spain. In section 4 we undertake
the quantitative analysis to assess the ability of different education policies to account for the
differences between Spain and the average of the EU-15 countries in terms of labor market
outcomes. We also explore some alternative explanations. Finally, section 5 concludes and the
Appendix contains the details regarding the data and additional results that complement our
analysis.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and in the economy there is a mass one of infinitely lived workers which
are endowed with an ability level a. The key feature of our model is that ability is distributed
according to a continuous density λ(a) on a set of possible abilities A. We also assume that
workers differ in their education level: some of them are educated, denoted e, and some of them
are not, denoted ne. Thus, unlike ability, education is a discrete variable with only two mass
points.
We think of the probability of each ability to receive education and of the effective ability after
education as the education outcomes in the economy. Therefore, we assume there is a selection
rule σ(a) : A→ [0, 1], which indicates the fraction of agents with education amongst those with
ability level a. We use µ(a) = σ(a)λ(a) to denote the fraction of (educated) e-agents with innate
ability level a. Furthermore, we assume that innate ability is mapped into effective ability, ãj
for j = e, ne, as follows
ãj = ψja, (1)
with ψe ≥ ψne = 1. Thus it is natural to think of ψe as the quality of education.
In the production side of the economy there are firms/jobs that are either vacant or filled.
These jobs differ in the minimum education requirement that a worker needs to satisfy to be
able to successfully operate the corresponding technology. This means that there are firms with
a technology such that ne-workers are unable to properly operate. We refer to these firms as
high-tech firms, denoted h. Also, there are firms such that their technology can be operated
by both educated and non educated workers, which we informally label as low-tech firms, and
denote them by l. We denote by yij(a) the output of a firm type i = h, l employing a worker
with education j = e, ne, and ability level a ∈ A. We assume that y′ij(a) > 0, so that for all
worker types and sectors output is larger the larger is the ability of the worker. Slightly abusing
from notation, below we will denote by µij the mass of j-educated agents that are employed or
are looking for a job in the i-sector. Finally, creating a vacancy has a cost cv and an employment
relationship breaks up at exogenous rate δi. Once unemployed a worker receives unemployment
benefits b.
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We follow the Mortensen-Pissarides tradition and we assume that there are frictions in the labor
market, such that both firms and workers need to spend some resources before a productive
match can be formed. These frictions are captured by a matching function relating the number of
new matches to the number of unemployed workers and to the number of outstanding vacancies.
Hence, in this formulation of the labor market externalities due to congestion naturally arise
and play an important role in shaping the equilibrium configuration. Notice that given the
technological constraint about the education requirements, it is clear that ne-workers would
never look for a job in the h-sector, hence in this sense the labor market is segmented by
education. The assumptions on technology place no restriction on educated workers being
able to operate the low-tech technology, and yet, we cannot rule out that the labor market be
additionally segmented by ability: it is possible that some educated workers (presumably with
low ability) choose to search jobs in the low-tech sector. This is the notion of overeducation that
we study in this paper.12 In order to better focus on this issue, we will assume that unemployed
workers can only search for a job in one market, hence educated workers must choose beforehand
whether to search for a job in the high or in the low sector. Likewise, a firm willing to create a
vacancy needs to choose beforehand the sector in which it will be created.13
Given these assumptions the number of productive matches in sector i = h, l is given by a
constant returns to scale matching function M(vi, xi) defined on the number of vacancies (vi) and
the mass of unemployed workers (xi) participating in the corresponding market. The matching
functions satisfy M(vi, xi) = m(θi)xi, where θi = vi/xi and m(θi) = M(θi, 1). This means
that the probability of an unemployed worker finding a vacancy, and the probability of a vacant
position to be filled with an unemployed worker, are given respectively by m(θi) and m(θi)/θi.
2.1 The problem of a worker
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral and thus they maximize the present value of income:
wages and unemployment benefits. We denote wij(a) the wage of a worker type j = e, ne, with
ability level a, who is matched to a firm in sector i = h, l, and we denote Wij(a) the value of
this match. Similarly, Uij(a) stands for the value of searching for a job in sector i = h, l, for a
type j = e, ne worker with ability level a. The asset value of employment for a worker is given
by:
rWij(a) = wij(a) + δi(Uij(a)−Wij(a)), (2)
for i = h, l, j = e, ne, all a ∈ A, and where r is the discount rate. The equation states the usual
no arbitrage condition stressed in the literature: that the flow value of a type-j worker with
ability level a who is employed in a type-i firm equals the sum of the flow return wij(a) plus the
expected instantaneous capital loss δi(Uij(a) −Wij(a)) (from Wij(a) to Uij(a) which happens
with probability δ). Likewise, the asset value of looking for a job in the i-sector for a worker
with education level j and ability level a is given by
rUij(a) = b+m(θi) {Wij(a)− Uij(a)} , (3)
which has a similar interpretation to the previous one about value of employment (m(θi) is the
arrival rate of a job offer to a worker in the i-sector). In the current environment overeducation
12See Herz and Van Rens (2011) for a related notion of potential inefficiency: the excessive unemployment
above the level a planner would have chosen (inefficient unemployment).
13Saint-Paul (1996) and Cuadras-Morato and Mateos-Planas (2006) introduce similar assumptions.
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may arise if for some ability level we have that an e-worker looks for (and accepts) jobs in the
l-sector. That is, overeducation occurs when there is a subset Ã ⊆ A such that Uhe(a) ≤ Ule(a)
for a ∈ Ã.
2.2 The problem of the firm
Firms create vacancies at a cost cv irrespectively of the sector of operation, and we denote Vi
for i = h, l the value of a newly created vacancy that is not yet operative because it is vacant.
The value of an operative match between a job in sector i and a worker type j and ability a is
given by Jij(a), and it satisfies:
rJij(a) = yij(a)− wij(a) + δi[ max
i′∈{h,l}
Vi′ − Jij(a)]. (4)
This equation states that the flow value of an operative position equals the flow value of output
yij(a) net of labor cost, wij(a), plus the expected change in its capital value: the match will be
broken with probability δi and in that event the firm will be allowed to choose again the sector
of operation (maxi′∈{h,l}). After the optimal choice of sector of operation, i
′, the asset value will
change in the amount Vi′ − Jij(a).
The value of creating a vacancy in the h-sector satisfies:
rVh = −cv +
m(θh)
θh
{max{Eµ[Jhe(a)]− Vh, 0}} . (5)
The flow value of creating a vacancy, rVh, equals its cost of creation, −cv, plus the expected
change in the asset value due to filling the vacancy with a suitable worker. The flow probability
of a vacancy being match with a worker in h-sector is m(θh)/θh. The max operator reflects
the fact that it may not be profitable for a firm in the h-sector to offer a job to an educated
worker (if her ability level is too low). Accordingly, Eµ in the expression above is the expectation
conditional on meeting an educated worker as implied by the measure µ(a). We also have













for the case of a vacancy in the low-tech sector. In this case the flow value of opening a vacancy
in the l-sector, rVl, equals its cost of creation, −cv, plus the expected change in its asset value,
which depends of the type of the worker that meets the vacancy. In the previous expression
m(θl)/θl is the probability of a match between a vacancy and an unemployed worker. Also,
xle stands for the mass of educated unemployed workers searching for a job in the low-tech
sector (xlne is the corresponding number of non educated workers, and xl = xle + xlne). Thus
(m(θl)/θl)(xle/xl) is the probability of meeting an e-worker who is searching in the l-sector,
and (m(θl)/θl)(xlne/xl) is the probability of meeting an unemployed ne-worker. As before, Eµ
stands for the conditional expectations operator as implied by µ, the distribution of education
and ability. Hence, if an e-worker meets a vacancy the asset value is expected to change in
Eµ[Jle(a)]− Vl (provided that the vacancy is filled, and zero otherwise). If, however, the match
involves the vacancy and a non educated worker then the asset value is expected to change
in Eµ[Jlne(a)] − Vl. Finally, in the equilibrium we consider we will assume free entry, so that
Vh = Vl = 0 will hold.
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2.3 Wage setting rule
We assume that once an unemployed worker is matched to a posted vacancy, the firm and the
worker engage in a Nash bargaining process in order to split the surplus that the match may
potentially create. Under these assumptions the wages satisfy
wij(a) = argmax (Wij(a)− Uij(a))β (Jij(a)− Vi)1−β , (7)
(where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the workers), which is obtained by satisfying
the FOC of the bargaining problem:
(1− β)(Wij(a)− Uij(a)) = β(Jij(a)− Vi). (8)
2.4 Stationary equilibrium
To simplify the exposition we introduce here an assumption that will also be useful in our
quantitative analysis. In particular, we assume that the technology to produce goods is linear
in ability:
yij(a) = yi + ỹij ãj . (9)
The term yi captures the component of production that is sector-specific and unrelated to the
ability of the worker operating the technology. The term ỹij allows us to capture the fact that
marginal productivity of ability may be both education and sector specific.14 Subtituting Eq.
(2), Eq. (3) and the expression for Jij(a) from Eq. (4) after imposing the free entry condition
Vi = 0 in Eq. (7) we obtain:
wij(a) =
β(r + δi +m(θi))yij(a) + (1− β)b(r + δi)
r + δi + βm(θi)
, (10)
which after substituting Eq. (9) can be written as
wij(a) = wi + wija, (11)
with
wi =
β(r + δi +m(θi))yi + (1− β)b(r + δi)




β(r + δi +m(θi))yij
r + δi + βm(θi)
, (13)
and where yij = ỹijψj . Hence wages in each sector and for each type of worker are a linear
function of the ability of the worker a (albeit they depend non linearly on the relevant θi). This
characterization is useful because it allows us to write the asset value of unemployment in each
sector also as a linear function of a: inserting Eq. (2) into Eq. (3) and rewriting produces:
rUij(a)− b = m(θi)
[wij(a)− b]
r + δi +m(θi)
, (14)
14We discuss in section 3.2 that by considering separately the effect of education on ability (by the term ψe), and
the associated marginal productivity of effective ability in production (by the term ỹij) will help us to calibrate
the model in a transparent way and consistently with the empirical observations on the distribution of ability and
the average effective ability of tertiary educated workers.
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which using the above expressions for wages can be written as:









r + δi + βm(θi)
. (17)
Thus with the linearity in a of Uij(a) there can be overeducation if the straight lines described
by Uhe(a) and Ule(a) cross for some a ∈ A for the given θ’s. For instance, in case of positive
assortative matching there is a threshold ā such that Uhe(ā) = Ule(ā) and Uhe(a) > Ule(a) ⇐⇒
a ≥ ā (and thus Ã = {a ∈ A : a ≤ ā}).15 Of course, the model also allows the case of no
overeducation (when Uhe(ā) and Ule(ā) do not cross in the positive orthant). Figure 1 portrays
an example with potential overeducation and a situation without it.
This characterization of the possibility of overeducation greatly simplifies the notion of stationary
equilibrium.16 Specifically, given a θi for i = h, l we can use the value of unemployment for an
e-worker in each sector using Equations (15)-(17) to pin down a value for ā. Given this value ā
then the joint distribution of education and ability determines the distribution of the labor force
across sectors (i.e., µij). The value ā, the distribution of the labor force and the stationary flow
conditions of the labor market are then used used to determine the right hand side of Equations
(5) and (6). Hence the values θi for i = h, l constitute an equilibrium if the values of creating a
vacancy are such that Vi = 0 (due to free entry). More precisely,
Definition: Given λ(a) and σ(a) implying µ(a), a Stationary Equilibrium consists of a list θh, θl
such that:
i) ā is determined as Uhe(ā) = Ule(ā) when the value of unemployment is given by Eq. (15)-(17).














where µij stand for the mass of j-educated agents in the i-sector.
iii) Labor markets are stationary:
xhem(θh) = x̄heδh, xlem(θl) = x̄leδl, and xlnem(θl) = x̄lneδl, (19)
where x̄ij/xij stand for the mass of employed/unemployed j-educated agents in the i-sector and
thus x̄ij + xij = µij .
iv) The following free entry conditions hold:
0 = −cv +
m(θh)
θh
{Eµ[Jhe(a)|a ≥ ā]} , (20)
and












15The case of positive sorting is the one empirically relevant (see CMMP and the references therein), thus in
our quantitative analysis we disregard negative sorting.
16We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to us the approach to the definition of equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Different types of equilibrium
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and where yij(a) satisfies Eq. (9) and wij(a) satisfies Equations (11)-(13).
As previously noted in AV and in CMMP in similar models with a discrete number of ability
levels there are three possible equilibrium configurations which are respectively characterized
by (1) ex-post segmentation, when all educated workers work or look for jobs in the h-sector
(remember that non educated workers can operate only the technology of the l-sector), (2)
employment overeducation , which is observed when some educated workers look for and accept
jobs in the l-sector, or (3) the case of multiple equilibria in which both types are simultaneously
possible.17
With the linearity of the value of unemployment with respect to ability for an equilibrium with
employment overeducation to exist it is necessary that in Equations (16) and (17), uh ≤ ul and







In this case ability displays comparative advantage in the h-sector and thus educated but low-
ability workers end up looking for jobs in the l-sector.18 It is clear from the necessary condition
in Eq. (23) for the existence of positive sorting that there are many parameter configurations
that are compatible with such mismatch. Before we continue we briefly discuss the connections
between the previous condition and the results in AV and CMMP.
Remarks
Remark 1: In line with the results in CMMP, it is clear from Equation (23) that SBTC consisting
in increasing yhe relative to yle (the marginal productivity of ability in the h-sector relative to the
l-sector) will favor the existence of employment overeducation. Hence our condition in Equation
(23) offers a new insight for the existence of overeducation based on increased comparative
advantage of higher ability e-workers in the h-sector.
Remark 2: The fact that the above sort of SBTC is able to give rise to employment overeducation
is not possible in the AV model, in which search is undirected (there is a single labor market)
and thus increasing yhe relative to yle tends to reduce overeducation favoring an equilibrium with
ex-post segmentation. Without disregarding the importance of undirected search, we notice that
in our model with directed search a SBTC consisting in increasing yh relative to yl (that is, the
sector specific parameter in the technology) will produce the same effects as in the AV model.
Remark 3: There may be employment overeducation as long as yl is large relative to yh. Thus,
the costs of operating a vacancy stressed in CMMP as a necessary condition to generate overe-
ducation appear to be irrelevant once production depends not only on the ability of the agent
but also on the sector where she is (potentially) employed.
17We notice that in addition to these possibilities, in our model with a continuum of abilities we cannot rule
out the possibility of multiple equilibria of the employment overeducation type: all that would be required are
congruent expectations about θi. All in all, in our quantitative work in section 4 we numerically check that the
equilibrium we find is in fact unique.
18See Sattinger (1975) for an early development of a sorting condition along this lines. If the opposite inequality
holds then the equilibrium is characterized by negative assortative matching, and so high-ability workers would
end up looking for jobs in the l-sector. For completeness, it is worth mentioning that the theoretical model admits
additional forms of mismatch but they violate the assumption that yij > 0.
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2.5 Discussion of the effect of the education rule
It is instructive to briefly discuss the potential effects of education as is represented in the model
and to develop the intuition for the results in the following sections. In the current model
the education outcome is the result of two different components: the selection rule of abilities
to receive education and the labor productivity enhancement that education provides to the
individual. These components are likely to shape the equilibrium outcomes and, in particular,
have a sizable effect on the fraction of overeducated workers.
First, the fraction of overeducated workers depends on the distribution of education on the
support A, i.e., on how the abilities to receive education are selected. For instance, for a given
value of ā as in Figure 1, there would be no overeducation if all educated workers happen to have
a larger than ā. We capture the selection rule by σ(a), the fraction of agents with ability level a
that receive education. Consider the implementation of a more stringent selection rule such that
more higher ability workers get education and fewer lower ability workers do so. The top panel
of Figure 2 (in the figure Λ(a) is the cdf of λ(a)) portrays an example along these lines: the
resulting distribution of education with the new rule σ(a)′ First Order Stochastically dominates
the distribution under the old rule σ(a). It is clear that with a more selective rule overeducation
-measured as the height of the function
∫
λ(a)σ(a)da at a given ā- will unambiguously decrease
irrespectively of the position of ā. The First Order Stochastic dominance property of a new
selection rule is critical to reduce overeducation by improving selection. To see this, consider
the lower panel in Figure 2. The new rule decreases the mass of educated agents at lower levels of
ability, but it does not necessarily increase the mass at the higher ability levels. The figure shows
that overeducation would decrease if the indifferent ability level is given by ā, but overeducation
would increase if the indifferent ability level is ā′.
Second, the labor productivity enhancement parameter ψe that is embedded in yhe and in yle is
also likely to affect overeducation. In particular, the slopes of Uhe(a) and Ule(a) in Equation (17)
increase if ψe increases. With given θi’s then the representation in Figure 1 for overeducation
with positive sorting obtained when condition (23) holds implies that after an increase in ψe not
only the value of unemployment in each sector will certainly increase for an e-worker, but also
that ā will shift to the left and thus overeducation will decrease.
Finally, changes in σ, ψe and ψne will also have an effect on the degree of tightness in each
sector, θi, which in turn will indirectly affect the determination of ā. In particular, it is clear
from Equations (16) and (17) that increases in θi leading to larger m(θi) will increase both the
intercept and slope of the Uij(a) curves in Equations (16) and (17), hence the final effect on ā
will depend on the relative shifts of the two curves. The intuition from the usual search and
matching model (e.g. Diamond 1982, Mortensen 1982 and Pissarides 1990) suggests that θi is
larger the larger is the profit to a firm of forming a match. Roughly speaking, θi is expected to
be larger the higher is ψi as well as the easier is to form a match with a higher ability worker
of the desired type. With this in mind Figure 3 offers a different insight of the effects of a more
stringent selection rule. The new rule improves the average ability among educated workers
and worsens it among non educated workers. The implication of this fact is that θh will tend
to increase whereas θl will tend to decrease. These changes in θi’s induce the corresponding
upward and downward shifts represented in Figure 3. Notice that the level ā decreases not only
to ā′ but to ā′′ precisely because improving selection for e-workers implies at the same time a
worse selection for ne-workers.
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The previous discussion suggests that the fraction of overeducated workers is jointly determined
by the distribution of abilities among educated and non educated workers and by the position
of the threshold level ā. The sort of policy changes that we explore in the following sections
usually involve simultaneous shifts of both the distribution of abilities and of ā. Since sometimes
these shifts operate in opposite directions a quantitative analysis is needed in order to assess
their implications.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We fix functional forms and we discipline our quantitative exercise with a calibration of model
parameters grounded on relevant statistics.
3.1 Functional forms
We assume that the matching functions are Cobb-Douglas of the form




i , i = h, l, (24)
where η ∈ (0, 1) measures the vacancy-elasticity of the matching function. This assumption is
in line with most of the quantitative literature about frictional labor markets (see for instance
the closely related papers by AV and CMMP).






if a ≥ am and zero otherwise. We require this density to have finite mean and variance hence we
assume α > 2. With respect to the education outcomes we explore the implications of a general
selection rule such that for all a ≥ am:






Notice that if σ1 = 0, then the fraction of educated workers is the same for all ability levels, and
that if σ1 > 0, then the fraction of educated workers increases with the level of ability. Finally,
notice that the function σ(a) is bounded, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Under these
assumptions we have that






where µ0 = (σ0 + σ1)αa
α
m, and that µ1 = σ1αa
1+α
m . The two-parameter family of selection rules
is convenient because it allows us not only to control for the mass of educated agents, but also
for their average ability.
3.2 Calibration
In our calibration strategy there is a first block of parameter values that we borrow directly
from existing studies in the related literature. This is the case of the worker’s bargaining power
14
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Figure 3: A more stringent selection
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β, which we fix at 0.5, the parameters that govern the matching technology (mh = ml = 1,
η = 0.5) and the quarterly interest rate r, which is set to 0.013. These are all the same as in AV.
Hobijn and Sahin (2009) estimate a quarterly separation rate of 0.07 for the Spanish economy.
Consistently with this estimate we fix δh = δl = 0.07. In addition we normalize ψne to 1 and yl
is normalized so that the productivity of the workers with the smallest ability in the low-tech
sector is equal to 1.
Second, we fix the parameters that govern the distribution of innate ability. In particular we
identify am and α by targeting the mean and dispersion in the PISA scores (Science) for Spain
in 2006, which are respectively 4.88 and 0.19 (targeting the mean in the PISA score is simply a
normalization criteria). We therefore fix am = 4.10 and α = 6.3 and these two parameter values
pin down the distribution of innate ability.19
Third, we calibrate the parameters governing the education rule σ0, σ1 and ψe. One important
target for the identification of ψe is the relative roles played by the selection of abilities that
receive education and by the quality of education in shaping the score of tertiary e-workers
relative to ne-workers. Although the evidence on this is scarce (see for instance Fang 2006 and
Hendricks and Leukhina 2014), the results in Fang (2006) suggest that about two thirds of the
wage premium in the US is accounted for by productivity enhancement of college attendance.
In our analysis we pursue this target. Since ψne is normalized to 1, we need to fix ψe = 1.15.
20
Note that if ψe was assumed to be 1 the ability gap between tertiary educated and non educated
workers would all be due to selection into education alone. With this parameter fixed we select
σ0 and σ1 to target the fraction of individuals with tertiary education according to European
Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in 2007, which is 0.31, and the mean
score in math test of individuals with tertiary education relative to non educated individuals
according to the results from PIAAC (2013), which is 1.2.21 Within the model this is equivalent
to an average effective ability of 5.77 for tertiary educated workers and of 4.81 for non educated
individuals. Table 2 contains this second set of parameter values and relevant data targets.
Finally we calibrate cv, yh, ỹhe, ỹle, ỹlne and b to match specific targets of the Spanish labor
market, which are reported in Table 3. In particular, we restrict parameter values to be consistent
with: (i) the incidence of unemployment across education groups, (ii) the tertiary education wage
premium and, finally, (iii) the degree of inequality in the labor market within each education
category (thus we restrict the equilibrium to be consistent with the coefficient of variation
of wages, denoted CV , according to the level of education of the workers). These statistics
provide us with the information needed to calibrate the parameters that govern the importance
of ability to determine productivity and wages in each sector and the relative wages across
different education groups. To this end we use microdata from EU-SILC (2007) and find that
CVe = 0.38 and CVne = 0.27.
22 For the sake of consistency we use this same database to calculate
19Cubas, Ravikumar and Ventura (2013) also proxy the distribution of talent in several countries using the
distribution of PISA scores.
20In the benchmark economy the tertiary educated wage premium is 1.45. In the absence of the productivity
enhancement by the education system that we assume (i.e. if ψe = 1) the compute a wage premium equal to 1.15.
Therefore productivity enhancement accounts for the remaining wage premium up to 1.45, which is 66% (30/45)
of the whole wage premium in the benchmark economy.
21Since effective ability is an outcome of the education rule the corresponding parameters are calibrated by
targeting statistics of the distribution of education and math scores in the adult population who have already
completed their education.
22Our sample consists of male individuals aged 25 to 54. Wages correspond to full-time workers after trimming
the bottom and top 5% of the distribution in each education group.
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the tertiary education wage premium (1.44) and the unemployment rates by education.23 The
9% unemployment rate of non educated workers and the 4% of the tertiary educated workers
are used in the identification process.24 Finally, an important target in the calibration is the
wage of educated relative to non educated workers conditioning for those who are mismatched.
According to Hidalgo et al. (2015) using the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (which is a
sample of Social Security Administration records) the ratio of the average wage of mismatched
college to non-college workers is about 1.15. Since our focus here is on tertiary educated instead
of college educated individuals it is appropriate to target a smaller value and thus we pursue a
10% premium.25
To determine the equilibrium in the numerical simulations we proceed iteratively: given initial
guesses for θi we find the implied wages and a potential threshold level ā. With this information
we integrate the values of active matches and check if the free entry conditions are close to zero,
and we iterate on the θi until these conditions are approximately satisfied. Once a candidate
equilibrium with overeducation is found we check that no other equilibrium can be found nearby:
we restart the algorithm from many different initial conditions and check that we always converge
to the same candidate. Furthermore, we also check that there is no equilibrium with ex-post
segmentation so that the equilibrium with employment overeducation is unique. To rule out this
possibility we solve for equilibrium assuming that Ã = ∅ and check that Uhe(am) < Ule(am).








PISA mean score science (OECD 2006) 4.88
PISA standard deviation to mean (OECD 2006) 0.19
Fraction of workers with tertiary educ. (EU-SLIC 2007) 0.31
Average skills tertiary educ. relative to non educ. (PIAAC 2013) 1.2
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters and Targets I
23Note that the wage premium, the unemployment rates and the fraction of tertiary educated workers for Spain
that we target according to EU-SILC data are slightly different from the figures with OECD data reported in
Table 1.
24Although the full set of parameters affects each of the equilibrium outcomes, it is reasonable to think the
unemployment rates are especially relevant for the identification of cv and b.




yl = −0.76 ψne = 1 β = 0.5 η = 0.5
mh = ml = 1 δh = δl = 0.07 r = 0.013
cv = 0.13 ψe = 1.15 yh = −1.53 ỹhe = 0.59
ỹle = 0.45 ỹlne = 0.43 b = 1.25
Targets Data Model
Unemp. rate dropouts (EU-SLIC 2007) 0.09 0.09
Unemp. rate tertiary educ. (EU-SLIC 2007) 0.04 0.05
Tertiary educ. wage premium (EU-SLIC 2007) 1.44 1.45
Tertiary educ. wage premium, mismatched (Hidalgo et al. 2014) 1.10 1.09
CV of wages, tertiary ed. (EU-SLIC 2007) 0.38 0.37
CV of wages, non educated (EU-SLIC 2007) 0.27 0.25
Frac. of wage premium accounted for by selection (Fang, 2006) 0.33 0.33
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters and Targets II
3.3 Benchmark
In this section we assess the suitability of our benchmark economy to perform counterfactual
analysis. The equilibrium outcome of our main interest is the size of employment overducation
that the model economy endogenously generates. Interestingly, this fraction is equal to 33%,
a figure that is very close to that reported by Eurostat in 2009.26 Of course, the comparison
between the model and the data in this respect is not straightforward because the model and the
data do not necessarily capture the same notion of overeducation. In particular, as we argued in
the Introduction, our model produces persistent overeducation whereas in the data employment
overeducation could also include temporary phenomena. However, according to the empirical
evidence we refer to in the Introduction in Spain overducation is very persistent over the life-
time and therefore its transitory component is expected to be modest. Thus our calibration is
consistent with the case of Spain, but our counterfactual analysis below will remain silent about
overeducation of a different nature that may well be relevant in other EU-15 countries.
As a validation exercise of our benchmark economy we explore the implications of reducing the
fraction of tertiary educated workers to the 21% observed in the beginning of the 90’s.27 In
Table 4 we compare the labor market outcomes of our benchmark economy with those in this
counterfactual economy (in order to do that we set σ0 = 0.15, instead of the σ0 = 0.25 in
our benchmark). We obtain that the fraction of overeducated workers decreases from 0.33 to
0.30 and the tertiary education wage premium increases from 1.45 to 1.48 (an increase in the
26Unfortunately, the EU-SILC data does not provide information on the quality of the job match for each
worker, so we cannot compute the fraction of overeducated workers in this data set. The figure provided by
Eurostat is calculated as those with tertiary education who hold a job beneath their educational level.
27Starting in 1993 Spain went through a very deep recession with dramatic consequences on the labor market.
For this reason our comparison will be done with statistics prior to that year.
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Benchmark begining − 90s
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.21
Average skills tertiary educ. relative to non educ. (PIAAC 2013) 1.20 1.21
Unemp. rate, educated 0.04 0.05
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.10
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.30
Education wage premium 1.45 1.48
Education wage premium, overeducated 1.09 1.09
CV of wages, educated 0.37 0.39
CV of wages, non educated 0.26 0.26
GDP 1.39 1.33
Table 4: Changing tertiary education attainment
unemployment rate is observed, but it is negligible). This evolution is consistent with empirical
evidence for Spain. In particular, according Pijoan-Mas and Sánchez-Marcos (2010) the tertiary
education wage premium decreased from around 1.65 in 1993 to about 1.50 in 2000. Furthermore
Hidalgo et al. (2015) report a substantial increase of about 10 percentage points in the fraction
of overeducated workers using the MCVL. Finally, the unemployment rate of educated workers
was around 7% and around 10% for non-educated workers according to the Labor Force Survey.
In other words, the recent expansion of the educational attainment of the population in Spain
could account to some extent for the decrease in the tertiary education wage premium and the
increase in the fraction of employment overeducation.
4 Counterfactuals
In this section we conduct several counterfactual exercises to assess the impact of alternative
education rules on labor market outcomes and its ability to account for the differences observed
between Spain and the EU-15 countries. In general there are multiple alternatives to implement
a given education goal: for instance to increase the average ability of educated workers one could
increase it in all levels of abilities by means of a better quality of education (larger ψe) or one
could implement a more stringent selection of abilities to receive education (higher σ1 relative to
σ0). In the quantitative investigation we report below we discipline the analysis by restricting
the fraction of educated workers to be the same and the ability of the different types of workers to
be that observed in the EU-15 countries. We also analyze as alternative explanations differences
in the productivity of the two sectors. In our analysis we mainly focus on the consequences for
the figures stressed in the Introduction: the fraction of overeducated workers, the unemployment
rate of each education group and the tertiary education wage premium.
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4.1 Improving tertiary education outcomes
In our first exercise we evaluate the effects of improving the education outcomes of tertiary
education. To this end, the first column of Table 5 reproduces the benchmark situation that
was introduced above. For completeness and to easy the comparison, in the second column we
report a summary of observations for EU-15 from Table 1.28
In the third column of Table 5 (S ) we provide the statistics of an economy in which the selection
of abilities is more stringent (in the First Order Stochastic dominance sense): fewer lower ability
workers receive tertiary education but a larger fraction of higher ability workers do so. In
particular, the parameters of the education rule are selected such that the fraction of e-workers
is the same as in the benchmark, but their average skills increased half the way towards the EU
average (from 5.77 to 5.92). This is implemented with a σ0 smaller than in the benchmark and
equal to 0.2 and with a larger σ1 and equal to 0.8. A first implication of this policy is that the
average effective labor productivity is larger for educated workers and lower for non educated
workers (see that average skills are larger for educated and lower for non educated workers),
which translates into a larger market value of education. Given this, the ratio of vacancies in
the high sector relative to that in the low sector increases (from 1.03 to 1.67, not reported in
the table because there is not empirical counterpart) and in the new equilibrium θh is higher
and θl is lower than in the benchmark. It follows that the fraction of overeducated workers
goes down to 0.24 and the wage premium of education increases up to 1.54 (as a matter of fact,
the value of ā decreases from 4.45 in the benchmark to 4.39). Notice that this is the result
of both a compositional effect (since now the mass of e-workers among higher ability types is
larger), and the endogenous response of the e-workers that are now more prone to search for a
job in the h-sector. In other words, by improving selection, overeducation decreases because of
the combined effect of the improvement in the h-sector and the worsening in the l-sector. The
better selection shifts e-workers from the l to the h-sector but otherwise has no significant effects
on their unemployment rate, whereas the unemployment rate of ne-workers increases from 9%
to 12%. Finally, there is a slight decrease in GDP. The reason is that in spite of the increase in
output in the h-sector due to the higher employment rate of e-workers, it cannot counter balance
the reduction in the output of the l-sector due to the larger unemployment rate of ne-workers.
In the fourth column of Table 5 (Qe) we report the statistics of an economy in which the same
education outcome for e-workers achieved in S is implemented but by only increasing ψe up to
1.18 (hence selection is like in the benchmark case). Note in particular that in this case the
average ability of a ne-worker remains the same as in the benchmark economy. The increase
in ψe has a direct effect on the productivity of e-workers which tends to increase wages of
e-workers. In addition the increase in labor productivity makes more attractive for firms to
create vacancies in the h-sector, hence there is an additional indirect effect that increases the
probability of finding a job in the h-sector. These two effects explain the shift of e-workers from
the l-sector to the h-sector (ā decreases from 4.45 in the benchmark to 4.33) and the increase in
the wage premium. The shift of e-workers from the l to the h-sector worsens the average ability
of workers in the l-sector which in turn reduces the incentives to open vacancies in that sector.
That is, improving the productivity of e-workers has an indirect negative effect on the prospects
of ne-workers. This effect explains the increase in the unemployment rate of ne-workers.
28GDP for EU-15 is obtained by applying the proportion GDPEU-15/GDPSpain observed in the per capita
data in Purchasing Power Standards from Eurostat, which is 1.22, to the the Spanish GDP predicted by the
model.
21
Interestingly, although columns S and Qe follow different strategies to implement the same
average ability of e-workers, they have a similar impact on the fraction of overeducated workers.
It is worth noticing here that if we consider an economy with the same selection rule as in
economy S and in which the average ability of ne-workers is kept as in the benchmark economy
the fraction of overeducated workers would be higher than in S.29 Therefore, we conclude that
with two different policy rules producing the same average ability for e and ne workers, in one
combining selection and quality and in the other improving only quality, overeducation will be
smaller in the second. We come back to this issue below.
In the fifth column of Table 5 (S+Qe) we report the results under an education outcome that
matches the average ability of e-workers observed in EU-15. This is achieved by combining the
more stringent selection rule (reported in the third column) with a convenient increase in the
labor productivity of e-workers (the improvement due to selection is therefore implemented as
before, and the improvement due to quality is introduced by increasing ψe up to 1.19). We
notice that the increase in the labor productivity of e-workers that we implement here resembles
the Skill Biased Technological Change (SBTC) stressed in the literature: it is equivalent to an
increase in the productivity component of education in the h-sector (although a SBTC would not
alter the observed ability of e-workers). The general picture that emerges is that the direct effect
due to the increase in the productivity of e-workers reinforces the previous indirect effects of an
improved selection: it increases even more the average skills of e-workers and so the market value
of education also increases. We then observe a more notorious increase in the wage premium of
education up to 1.62, a higher ratio of vacancies in the h-sector relative to the l-sector of 2.28,
a reduction in employment overeducation to 0.11 (in particular ā decreases from 4.45 to 4.23)
and a slight reduction in the unemployment rate of e-workers which then delivers an increase
in GDP. As an illustration of the new equilibrium that is reached, Figure 4 in Appendix C
represents the change in the value of ā originated by the more stringent selection rule and by
shift in the slope of the Uij curves do to the changes in θe.
In view of the previous results we conclude that policies that improve the average quality of e-
workers (either indirectly by implementing a more restrictive selection or by directly increasing
the effective productivity of the workers that obtain education) would move the Spanish economy
closer to the EU-15 average, except for the higher unemployment rate among ne-workers that
it implies. All in all, the previous combination of policies is able to reproduce the average skill
of tertiary educated workers in EU-15 but it misses the same statistic for the non-educated.
In particular, the more stringent selection increases the fraction of low ability workers that are
not educated, hence their average ability is reduced from 4.81 to 4.75. This finding is relevant
because in Spain the average skills of both e-workers and ne-workers are lower than in EU-15,
but the difference is larger for ne-workers. We address this issue in the following subsection.
29In concrete we computed the equilibrium of an economy with the same selection as in S but we increased
ψne to keep the same average ability of ne-workers as in the benchmark economy (or as in Qe). The higher ψne
increases labor productivity of ne-workers and makes more attractive to create vacancies in the l-sector, which in
turn makes more attractive to look for jobs in that sector. Hence there is an indirect effect on θl such that the
probability of finding a job in the l-sector is now larger. Thus the previously indifferent e-worker is now better
off by looking for a job in the l-sector. In that economy overeducation is larger than in S (0.29 instead of 0.24),
hence also larger than in Qe.
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Bench. EU-15 S Qe S+Qe
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.31
Average skills, educated 5.77 6.13 5.92 5.92 6.13
Average skills, non educated 4.81 5.33 4.75 4.81 4.75
Unemp. rate, educated 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.13
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.11
Education wage premium 1.45 1.68 1.54 1.51 1.62
GDP 1.39 1.69 1.38 1.42 1.41
S : the selection of abilities is more stringent, S+Qe: the selection of abilities is
more stringent and the productivity of e-workers is larger.
Table 5: Counterfactuals: changing tertiary education outcomes
4.2 Improving the quality of educated and non educated workers
In the first two columns of Table 6 we repeat for convenience the results of the benchmark
economy and the European averages. In the third column of Table 6 we keep the selection
and labor productivity of e-workers as in column S +Qe in Table 5 and additionally we adjust
the labor productivity of ne-workers to match the average observed in EU-15 (this is column
S+Qe+ne, and in the model this amounts to fix ψne = 1.12). Improving the quality of ne-workers
increases their market value. Hence as a consequence of this policy we observe sizable reduction
in their unemployment rate and in the wage premium to education. The redistribution towards
the non educated workers that this policy implies in terms of relative wages is in line with the
results in Albrecht et al (2009). This is in contrast with the results in the previous section in
which the quality of education improved only for tertiary educated workers. In addition, some
of the lower ability but e-workers that under the previous policies preferred to look for jobs in
the h-sector (albeit longer unemployment spells), now find more profitable to look for jobs in the
l-sector in which wages are higher than before (and in which) an unemployment spell is shorter
due to a larger vacancy creation: relative vacancy creation now reduces to 0.59, substantially
smaller than the 2.28 observed under the S + Qe policy). As a consequence, not only non
educated workers but also mismatched educated workers benefit from a lower unemployment
rate. All in all, overeducation is 5 percentage points smaller than in the benchmark case but
larger than in the S+Qe policy (ā slightly shifts to the left, from 4.45 in the benchmark to 4.43).
That is, in this economy there is an indirect effect through a higher θl that counterbalances the
effects previously identified in the S+Qe economy. The reduction in the unemployment rates of
both educated and non educated workers explains the 19% increase in GDP. Under this policy,
therefore, we conclude that the model approaches the EU-15 average in several dimensions but
it still produces a wage premium of tertiary education that is smaller than in the benchmark
economy. Figure 5 in Appendix C provides a graphical exposition of the new equilibrium.
Finally, in the fourth column of Table 6 we keep selection as in the benchmark economy and
explore the effects of an improved labor productivity of education for both e-workers and ne-
workers (the column labeled Qe+ne). Thus one could alternatively think of this experiment
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Bench. EU-15 S+Qe+ne Qe+ne
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31
Average skills, educated 5.77 6.13 6.13 6.13
Average skills, non educated 4.81 5.33 5.33 5.33
Unemp. rate, educated 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.19 0.28 0.23
Education wage premium 1.45 1.68 1.37 1.37
GDP 1.39 1.69 1.65 1.65
S+Qe+ne: the selection of abilities is more stringent and all workers are more
productive, Qe+ne: all workers are more productive.
Table 6: Counterfactuals: changing education system outcomes
as an improvement in the overall productivity of workers, which could be originated in the
education system or not. In this exercise we keep σ0 = 0.25 and σ1 = 0.42 as in the benchmark
case and we fix ψe = 1.22 and ψne = 1.11 to match the average labor productivity in EU-15.
Notice that in order to match the EU-15 statistics ψe is larger than in the policy reported in
column S +Qe of Table 5. All the statistics move in the same direction than in the case of the
policy explored in the third column. However, the decrease in overeducation with respect to the
benchmark is larger in this scenario (the critical ability level ā shifts to the left, from 4.45 in
the benchmark to 4.32). This is exactly the result that we expected after our discussion in the
previous section of alternative ways of improving the education outcomes (in terms of average
abilities) for all workers. As we explained, overeducation is smaller when quality, rather than
quality and selection, is used to achieve the goal. Figure 6 in Appendix C graphically illustrates
the new equilibrium that is reached.
It is clear from the previous tables that in Spain the fraction of e-workers is slightly larger
than in EU-15, thus it is natural to ask if this fact is quantitatively relevant to account for the
differences observed in labor market outcomes. We explored this possibility by reducing σ0 to
match the fraction of tertiary educated workers in EU-15. In this case it was observed a small
reduction in overeducation, to 0.32. If we instead implemented the reduction of the fraction of
tertiary educated workers by reducing only the value of σ1, then the fraction of overeducated
workers would be even larger (0.38). The reason is that in that scenario the role of individual’s
ability to be selected in tertiary education is played down. Hence the differences between Spain
and the EU-15 do not seem to be accounted for by the differences in the fraction of educated
workers in Spain.
4.3 Alternative explanations
It is often argued that the expansion of the housing sector that fueled the most recent boom of
the Spanish economy may be responsible for some of the misbehavior of the labor market with
respect to other developed countries. In this section we try to remove the effect of the housing
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Bench. EU-15 low-tech high-tech
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31
Average skills, educated 5.77 6.13 5.77 5.77
Average skills, non educated 4.81 5.33 4.81 4.81
Unemp. rate, educated 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.10
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.19 0.19 0.19
Education wage premium 1.45 1.68 1.47 1.47
GDP 1.39 1.69 1.33 1.40
low-tech: the productivity of this sector is lower, high-tech: the productivity of
this sector is larger.
Table 7: Counterfactuals: changing sector productivity
boom in the 2000’s and explore the implications for the equilibrium under a relatively less
productive l-sector. In order to discipline our exercise here we select the overall productivity of
the l-sector to target the fraction of overeducated workers in the EU-15 countries (we need a 3.7%
lower value of yl to achieve the fraction of overeducated workers in the EU-15 countries). In the
third column of Table 7 we report the result of this exercise. The reduction in the productivity of
the l-sector produces a small increase in the tertiary education wage premium from 1.45 to 1.47.
Furthermore, the unemployment rate is higher under these circumstances for the ne-workers,
going up from 9% to 14% . Therefore, although a relatively higher productivity of the l-sector
could be responsible for the higher incidence of overeducation in Spain with respect to EU-15, it
barely accounts for differences in the tertiary education wage premium. More importantly, this
widens the gap in terms of the unemployment rate of ne-workers between Spain and the EU-15
countries.
Finally, we extend the previous analysis with a brief exploration of the effects of a lower labor
productivity in the h-sector in Spanish firms relative to the EU-15 average as is sometimes
stated in informal debates (for a formal account of facts along these lines see Palazuelos and
Fernandez 2009 and the references therein). Specifically, in the last column of Table 7 we show
the implications of having a more productive h-sector, in which again we design the exercise to
target the fraction of overeducated workers observed in the EU-15 countries (we need a 2.4%
higher value of yh to achieve the fraction of overeducated workers in the EU-15 countries). As it
can be seen, this would move the tertiary wage premium and the unemployment rate of e-workers
in the right direction, but the effect would be rather modest. Furthermore, the unemployment
rate among ne-workers remains at a relatively high level.
4.4 Summary of the results
According to our analysis, changing the education rules to improve the ability of all workers
to meet the EU-15 standards would reduce the unemployment rate of both e and ne-workers
to the EU-15 levels and it would reduce the fraction of overeducated workers between 5 to 10
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percentage points. However, the education wage premium would move only slightly and in the
opposite direction to what is observed in EU-15 countries. In contrast, if only the education
outcomes of tertiary educated workers are improved, the fraction of overedcuated workers may be
more than halved and the wage premium can be increased up to 1.62. In this case however, the
unemployment rate of non educated workers would increase. We take these results as supporting
the view that differences in education outcomes are able to account for a sizable fraction of the
differences in overeducation and in the unemployment rate of Spain with respect to the EU-15
countries. However, our calibration exercises suggest that education outcomes by themselves
cannot account simultaneously for the differences in overeducation, unemployment and wage
premium to education, hence there may be other aspects that are missing in our model that are
relevant to provide a comprehensive understanding of the labor markets.
We extended the previous analysis by considering an scenario in which the productivity of
the l-tech sector (h-sector) is reduced (increased) to meet the fraction of overeducated workers
observed in the EU-15 countries. We find that such changes in productivity have a negative
effect on the unemployment rate of ne-workers and a very modest effect on the wage premium
to education. Furthermore, the gap in terms of average skills for all workers between Spain and
the EU-15 countries would remain unexplained in this case. In Appendix B we report the results
from additional exercises in which we combine the effects of the education policy along the lines
in subsection 4.2 with the reduction (increase) in the low-tech (high-tech) sector productivity
in the subsection 4.3. We find that the unemployment rates and the fraction of overeducated
workers are closer to the EU-15 statistics, but the wage premium to education is smaller than
in the benchmark case, hence in this dimension the economy worsens with respect to the EU-15
average.
5 Conclusions
We develop an equilibrium model of the labor market with frictions in which workers are hetero-
geneous in terms of ability and education. We depart from existing models in that we assume
that education does not only represent a barrier for non educated workers to obtain jobs in
technologically advanced firms, but it also increases labor productivity of educated workers in
the less advanced sector. Furthermore we consider a continuum of ability levels which allows us
to address the question of how differences in the composition of educated workers affects firms’
incentives to open different types of vacancies.
We perform a quantitative analysis in order to illustrate the implications of alternative edu-
cation outcomes on employment overeducation, unemployment and on tertiary education wage
premium. We discipline our model by calibrating the parameter values to match significant
facts of the Spanish economy. The results of these counterfactual experiments suggest that the
differences observed in the equilibrium labor market between Spain and the average of the EU-
15 countries would be smaller had Spain implemented a more selective education rule (improve
the ability mix of the educated workers), and/or if the education system was able to increase
labor productivity of both educated and non educated workers. In particular, according to our
quantitative analysis had the quality of education observed in Spain been similar to the Euro-
pean average then overeducation would have been between 5 and 10 percentage points lower
and the unemployment rate of the two types of workers would be reduced by 40%. However,
the tertiary education wage premium would be slightly smaller than in the benchmark economy.
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From a policy perspective it is important to emphasize that improving education outcomes of
only higher educated will effectively help to reduce overeducation, but at the cost of higher un-
employment among non educated workers and of more inequality in the wages across educated
and non educated workers.
Our analysis shows that there are significant effects of different education outcomes on the
unemployment rates, overeducation rates and on the the wage premium to education, but also,
that education outcomes alone are not able to account simultaneously for the discrepancies
between Spain and the EU-15. Thus there must be other issues that are relevant for the labor
market and that are missing in the current model. An interesting extension along these lines
would be to include transitory mismatch (sectoral, geographical or/and due to experimentation
along the lines indicated in the Introduction) and reevaluate the role of education in that richer
model. Related to this, we also find that different education policies have sizable effects on the
relative size of the sectors and on GDP. Our model remains silent with respect to how education
is financed and thus it is not possible to investigate the optimality or efficiency of education
policies. Extending the model to explicitly account for the cost and financing of education is
another promising line for future research.
We conclude with additional extensions of our work that are worth investigating. First, the
model studied in this paper belongs to a broad class in which multiple equilibria are possible.
Thus from the theoretical perspective it would be valuable to have a characterization of the
conditions under which such a multiplicity arises and under which the equilibrium is unique.
Second, in regards to the quantitative analysis, our model could be extended to consider ed-
ucation choices at the individual level. Currently the fraction of educated workers is purely
determined as the result of a particular education rule. Since in our framework there are incen-
tives to complete tertiary education even for those individuals who will end up working in the
l-sector, then allowing for the choice of the education level will not necessarily eliminate overe-
ducation. It would be interesting to quantify the effects of changes in the quality of education
(say in terms of additional units of efficient labor) and compare them with the implications of
more stringent requirements (in terms of minimal ability) to be allowed to complete tertiary
education. These extensions are left for future work.
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6 Appendix A: A closer look to EU-15
As indicated in the Introduction the notion of mismatch adopted in the current paper is the
definition of vertical mismatch proposed by Eurostat: a worker is considered to be occupational
mismatched if her educational attainment is at least ISCED 5, but her occupation is not consid-
ered to be ISCO 1, 2 or 3. ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education.
Levels 0 to 4 include education between pre-primary school and upper-secondary education.
Levels 5 and 6 are tertiary education levels (respectively, not leading/leading to an advanced
research qualification). ISCO stands for International Standard Classification of Occupations.
Categories 1, 2 and 3 include legislators, senior officials, managers, professionals, technicians
and associate professionals. Categories 4 to 9 include clerks, service workers, etc., to elementary
occupations.
In what follows we provide a more detailed account of the facts that motivate our research as
mentioned in the Introduction.
The Statistical Book of Eurostat corresponding to the Bologna Process in Higher Education in
Europe (2009) reports the distribution of tertiary students in the ISCED levels 5A, 5B, and 6
as a percentage of all tertiary students in private and public institutions for the period 2001
to 2006 (see the Table 8).30 It is clear from the table that the differences between Spain and
the average EU-15 in the mid 2000’s are remarkably small. Hence, the explanation for the
higher overeducation observed in Spain is not due to a disproportionately large/small fraction
of students involved in scientific/academic activity.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ISCED 5A 5B 6 5A 5B 6 5A 5B 6 5A 5B 6 5A 5B 6 5A 5B 6
EU-15 78 18 4 78 19 4 79 18 4 79 19 4 81 17 4 81 17 4
Spain 86 11 3 84 12 4 83 13 4 82 14 4 82 14 4 82 13 4
Source: UIS, UOE (The Bologna process in higher education in Europe 2009, Table 0 p. 189).
Table 8: Distribution of students in higher ISCED levels as a percentage of all tertiary students,
2001-06
Second, the distribution of the population across fields of specialization in Spain is similar to the
average of the EU countries, hence the higher fraction of overeducated workers in Spain was not
due to a higher concentration of workers in certain fields of specialization. Roughly speaking the
fraction of workers in “Humanities”, “Education”, “Agriculture”, “Health” and “Social sciences”
is similar in Spain to the average of the EU countries (see Table 9). There are only moderate
differences in the fraction of workers in “Science” (about 14% in the EU in contrast to 19% in
Spain) and in “Social sciences” (about 32% in the EU in contrast to 29% in Spain). Therefore we
conclude that the phenomena of occupational mismatch is not due to compositional differences
in terms of the fraction of educated workers in each field of specialization.
30ISCED level 5A are tertiary programs that are largely theoretically based and are intended to provide sufficient
qualifications for gaining entry into advanced research programs and profession with high skills requirements.
Programs in ISCED 5B are typically shorter than those in 5A and focus on occupationally specific skills geared
for entry into the labor market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered. Level ISCED 6 is reserved
for tertiary programs which lead to the award of an advanced research qualification (they typically require the





Humanities and Arts 8 7
Social sciences, Business and Law 32 29
Science, Mathematics and Computing 14 19
Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 28 27
Agriculture and Veterinary 3 4
Heath and Welfare 7 7
Services 3 1
Source: REFLEX 1999-2000. EU* includes Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Nether-
lands, Belgium, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Table 9: Distribution of Graduated Individuals Across Fields of Education
Next, we report in Table 10 the fraction of workers aged 25 to 34 who are considered to be
overeducated by field of education. The incidence of mismatch by field of specialization in Spain
is higher than the European average (with the sole exception of Agriculture and Veterinary).
It is clear that the average fraction of overeducated workers across fields of specialization is
substantially higher in Spain than in EU-15, and also that overeducation is not a phenomenon
concentrated in a very specific subset of fields. In EU-15 the highest fraction of overeducated
workers is found in Services (48) and it is followed by Agriculture (35) and Social Sciences (26).
In Spain the highest fraction is found in Services (64) and it is followed by Engineering field (50)
and Social Science (44). Both in Spain and in the average of the EU-15 the lowest fraction of
overeducated workers is found in Health fields (11 in UE-15 in contrast to 27 in Spain) and in
Education (11 in EU-15 and 28 in Spain). The largest gap between Spain and the UE-15 (more
than double) is found in Education field and it is followed by Health and Welfare.
EU-15 Spain
Education 11 28
Humanities and Arts 25 37
Social sciences, Business and Law 26 44
Science, Mathematics and Computing 14 28
Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 21 50
Agriculture and Veterinary 35 35
Health and Welfare 11 27
Services 48 64
Source: Eurostat, EU-LFS, 2003-2007 (The Bologna process in higher education in Europe 2009, Table D5.C p.
229).
Table 10: Percentage of Workers Vertical Mismatched, aged 25-34 by Field of Education
Finally, one may wonder about the comparability of tertiary educated workers in terms of
the official number of years of education across countries. In Table 11 we can see that for
the selected sample of countries there are noticeable differences in the distribution of years in
primary, secondary and high school. However, looking specifically at tertiary education the
differences seem rather small: in Spain higher education starts a year before than in other
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countries, but it takes one more year (together with Germany) to complete college education.
Given this, we would find difficult to justify the lower performance of tertiary educated workers
in Spain in terms of PIAAC scores simply by the smaller number of years of education.
Formal Prim.+sec. Voc. educ. Univ. Univ. educ.
school +high s. starts starts (min. years)
Austria 6 4+4+4 14/15 18 3+
Belgium 6 6+2+4(+1) 14 18 3+
Denmark 6 11+2 16 19 3+
Finland 7 9+3 16 19 3+
France 6 5+4+3 15 18 2+
Germany 6 4+6+3 16 19 4+
Grece 6 6+3+3 15 18 4+
Italy 6 5+3+5 14 19 3+
Ireland 4 8+6 15 18 3+
Luxembourg 6 6+3+4 15 19 5+
Netherlands 4 8+3+3 16 18 3+
Portugal 6 6+ 3+3 15 18 3+
Spain 6 6+4+2 15 18 4+
Sweden 7 9+3 16 19 3+
UK 5 6+3+2(+2) 16 18 3+
Source: Eurydice, The structure of the European Education systems 2009-10.
Table 11: European education systems
7 Appendix B: Simultaneous technology and policy changes
In this Appendix we report the results of combining each of the education reforms in Table 6
with the reduction (increase) in the low-tech (high-tech) sector productivity in Table 4. The
results are reported in Tables 12 and 13.
8 Appendix C: Graphical exposition
Figure 4 portrays the effect of improving the selection rule (orange curves) and of enhancing the
productivity of educated workers (green curves). The first change induces the shifts indicated
with the orange arrows due to the fact that θh increase and θl decreases. In this case ā would
decrease to ā′. The additional improvement due to the increase of ψe increases the slope of the
Uhe and Ule curves, which reinforces the initial effects on Uhe and counterbalances them on Ule.
These effects are represented by the green arrows and ā would further decrease from ā′ to ā′′.
Figure 5 represents the effects of improving labor productivity of non educated workers. This
improvement induces an increase in θl which then results in the upward shift of the Ule curve
(the orange arrow). In the new equilibrium it is observed an increase in overeducation up to ā′′′
(relative to the previous situation), but still it is smaller than in the initial equilibrium (ā).
Finally Figure 6 represents the improvement in labor productivity of both educated and non
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Figure 4: Equilibrium after improving selection and ψe
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Figure 5: Equilibrium with higher ψne, after improving selection and ψe
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Bench. EU-15 low-tech +S+Qe+ne low-tech +Qe+ne
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31
Average skills, educated 5.77 6.13 6.13 6.13
Average skills, non educated 4.81 5.33 5.33 5.33
Unemp. rate, educated 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.10
Education wage premium 1.45 1.68 1.39 1.39
GDP 1.39 1.69 1.63 1.63
Table 12: Counterfactuals: combinations I
Bench. EU-15 high-tech +S+Qe+ne high-tech +Qe+ne
Fraction of educated workers 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31
Average skills, educated 5.77 6.13 6.13 6.13
Average skills, non educated 4.81 5.33 5.33 5.33
Unemp. rate, educated 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
Unemp. rate, non educated 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05
Frac. of educated, overeducated 0.33 0.19 0.14 0.05
Education wage premium 1.45 1.68 1.39 1.39
GDP 1.39 1.69 1.66 1.66
Table 13: Counterfactuals: combinations II
educated workers, starting with the same selection rule it was in place in the benchmark equi-
librium. These changes induce an increase in the slope of Uhe as well as an increase in θh and θl
(as now both types are more productive than in the previous cases). The shift in Uhe is larger
because ψe is larger than before, which in turn induces a larger increase in θe. We summarize
the shifts in the black arrows, which delivers a decrease in overeducation. It is clear from this
graphical analysis that the final effect on equilibrium overeducation depends on the relative
strength of each of the effects discussed above. Hence the quantitative analysis is needed to
properly asses the net effects.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium after improving ψe and ψne
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